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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (j),
and the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 3.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Appellants Jakobe and Nicole Valentine present the question whether the lower
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The question
includes the following issues:
1.

Is the exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage in the policy of
automobile insurance at issue ambiguous and unclear?

2.

Does the exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage in the policy
deviate from the statutorily prescribed bounds, thereby violating
public policy and the intent of underinsured motorist coverage
protections?

3.

Is the exclusion from underinsured motorist coverage claimed by
Appelle Farmers inapplicable and/or void on the facts of this case?

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there exists no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 56 (c). The material facts are generally not in dispute in this case.
The appellate court is to determine whether the district court erred in applying
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governing law. Alfv. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co, 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah
1993). Interpretation of an insurance contract involves ordinary rules of contract
construction. SWEnergy Corp v. Continental Insurance Co, 91A Y2& 1239,
1242 (Utah 1999). The appellate court reviews the district court's legal
conclusions, according no deference to the trial court's interpretation of the policy
of insurance, but reviews the court's legal conclusions for correctness. Id. In
making this determination, the appellate court is to "view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002).

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT

The issues before this court were preserved in the trial court by Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 113], Plaintiffs Opposition [R. 186], and
evidence and argument presented to the court at the hearing on that Motion [R.
227, Partial Transcript of Hearing Ruling].
STATEMENT OF CASE

This appeal arises out of a first party contract action by Plaintiffs Nicole Valentine
and her husband, Jakobe, who brought suit in the Fourth District Court to enforce
the terms of the Underinsured Motorist Coverage portion of their automobile
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insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange. l [R. 12] Due to clerical
error, Plaintiffs counsel initially filed the complaint in the Third District Court,
which accepted the case and assigned a case number. Plaintiff filed a first
amended complaint on April 7, 2003. [R. 21] Upon realizing the filing error,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Change Venue, which was granted on June 3, 2003, and
the court Ordered the case transferred to the Fourth District Court. [R. 32]

Farmers answered and cross-claimed for declaratory relief, alleging that coverage
was excluded under provisions of the underinsured motorist coverage policy at
issue. [R. 72] On July 15, 2004, Farmers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
[R. 113] On November 10, 2004, the Fourth District Court, Judge Pullan, heard
oral argument on Farmers' motion. [R. 207, Minutes Oral Argument; R. 227,
Partial Transcript] Judge Pullan granted Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment
at the hearing. [R. 207] On November 29, 2004, the clerk transferred the case to
the American Fork department, with case number, 050100086. [R. 209] On
January 13, 2005, the court entered an order granting Farmers' Motion for
Summary Judgment. [R. 214] On February 11, 2005, Valentine timely filed a
Notice of Appeal. [R. 217] On March 22, 2005, this Court ordered the deposition
of Nicole Valentine be part of the record on appeal. [R. 224]
1

As it is Nicole Valentine's injuries and damages caused by the collision at issue,
references to "Valentine" will be to Nicole only, unless otherwise noted.
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Relevant Facts

On December 6, 2000, Nicole Valentine was seriously injured when the vehicle
she was driving was struck from behind by another vehicle, which in turn had
been struck by the negligently operated vehicle driven by Robert Nielsen
(Valentine settled her claim against Nielsen, and he has never been party to this
action or any other action arising out of this incident). [R. 20] Valentine
recovered the policy limits of $25,000 under Nielsen's automobile liability
insurance. Valentine also received Workers' Compensation benefits, as she
suffered the injury in the course of her employment as a parts delivery runner for
Frank Edwards Company (Parts Plus). Id. Valentine repaid a Workers'
Compensation lien out of the settlement she received from Nielsen's insurance.
Id. The monetary value of the total damages Valentine suffered exceeded the
insurance coverage available to her. [R. 19] Valentine made a claim against the
underinsured motorist coverage portion of her automobile insurance policy.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, the issuer of the Valentine policy, denied that claim.
Id.

At the time of the crash on December 6, 2000, Valentine was driving a Chevy
pick-up truck, owned by her employer, which she used to deliver parts in the
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course of her employment. [R.

, Deposition of Nicole Valentine (hereafter

"Valentine Depo") at 26-27] In her duties as a parts runner, Valentine used the
Chevy pick-up or another of the four vehicles owned by her employer for use in
parts delivery. [R.

, Valentine Depo at 28] She kept no keys to any of the

vehicles, and never took the vehicle home at the end of the day, to lunch, or on any
other personal errands. [Id.] Generally, on each workday she would receive
assignments for parts deliveries, get the keys to a vehicle, and make that portion of
the day's deliveries. [Id. at 31-36] She was one of six parts runners each of whom
made use of the vehicles owned by the company for their deliveries. [Id. at 31-32]
At lunch, she left the vehicle, and either took her own vehicle for lunch or made
other arrangements. [Id. at 28] At the end of the day she would retrieve her
personal vehicle from the parking lot and travel to home in her car. [Id. at 41]

DETERMINATIVE LAW

Appellant maintains that UCA §31A-22-305 (10) (a), (in effect at the time of the
collision, December 6, 2000) is of central importance to the determination of this
appeal, in that the exclusion claimed by Farmers exceeds the authority of the
statutorily permissible limitation on underinsured motorist coverage:
Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor
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vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured,
a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor
vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the
motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy. [Remainder of paragraph is not relevant to issues
herein.]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant maintains that the endorsement to the automobile insurance policy at
issue, relied upon by Farmers as an exclusion to coverage, is unclear and
ambiguous, and accordingly void. [See R. 39]

Appellant also maintains that the endorsement at issue is in derogation of the
statute allowing for specified limitation on underinsured motorist coverage, and is
in violation of Utah public policy and thus, unenforceable.

Appellant maintains that the exclusion claimed by Farmers is not applicable on the
undisputed facts presented and should not be given effect to exclude underinsured
motorist coverage for damages suffered by Nicole Valentine as a result of the
negligence of a driver with insufficient liability insurance coverage.

6

ARGUMENT
Utah's Motor Vehicle Insurance Code

In 1985 the Utah legislature enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme for motor
vehicle financial responsibility, codified at Utah Code § 31A-22-301, et seq.
Though amended many times since its inception, the motor vehicle insurance law
remains functionally the same as the statutory scheme put in place two decades
ago.

Component Parts of the Statutory Scheme

The motor vehicle financial responsibility statute defines three primary types of
insurance coverage:

1.

Liability coverage, to pay injured third parties resulting from the

insured's negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in damage. Utah
requires a minimum of $25,000 bodily injury liability coverage per
individual, $50,000 total per incident coverage regardless of number of cars
or individuals involved, and $15,000 property damage coverage on every
vehicle. See UCA 31A-22-302;
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2.

No-fault, or personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Utah law

requires a fixed amount of medical payment coverage (at least $3,000),
certain lost wages and related limited financial benefits paid to the insured
in the event of injury arising from use of the insured automobile, without
regard to fault or liability. See UCA 31A-22-306-309; and finally,

3.

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage (UM and UIM

coverage, respectively), which provides financial recovery for loss or
damages suffered by the insured due to the negligent operation of someone
else's motor vehicle, when that negligent operator is either not insured at all
or insured in an amount less than the legally required minimum amount
(generally, uninsured) or insured in an amount less than the damages
suffered by the injured party (underinsured). Utah law requires insurers
who issue liability policies in the State to provide UIM coverage in an
amount equal to the liability limits on that policy, or to obtain a written
waiver from the insured in the event the insured requests UIM coverage in
a lesser amount than the liability limits, or, alternatively if the insured
chooses to forego UIM coverage completely. See UCA 31A-22-305.
2

Being substantially similar in most material respects (see, e.g. Taylor v.
Travelers Indemnity Co, 9 P3d 1049 (Ariz. 2000)), UM and UIM coverage are
often used interchangeably, and will be referred to generally as UIM throughout
this brief unless otherwise noted.
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The three types of insurance defined in Utah law are distinctly different, of course,
in purpose, form, and nature. (See, e.g. Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 610
NW2d 467, 474-75 (Wise. 2000): "liability coverage differs from uninsured
motorist coverage, and the two are not to be equated"). A key difference is the
relationship(s) between the party seeking recovery under the insurance policy, and
the insurance company that is asked to pay under the policy.

In recovering on a liability policy, an injured individual nominally seeks payment
of damages from the negligent insured. On certain conditions and terms, the
insurer steps in to defend the claim and pay the damages, up to the limits of
liability under the policy. The individual(s) receiving money under the policy and
the company paying money generally need not have any contractual relationship
and the action is in tort law.

The action for no-fault (PIP) benefits is, as the name implies, not a matter of tort,
or fault, but a matter of contract between the injured insured and his insurer. Upon
proving certain facts and the amounts of expenses incurred, the insurer pays to the
insured (or medical providers or others, through the insured) benefits. Prince v.
Bear River Mutual Insurance Co., 56 P.3d 524, 531 (Utah 2002).
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The claim for underinsured motorist damages is a first party claim by the injured
policyholder against the insurer. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v.
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). To make a claim under a UIM policy, the
policyholder must establish damages to an extent exceeding the available liability
insurance coverage from the negligent driver.

The distinction between liability and UIM coverage is critical, in that many of the
authorities, cited by the parties in the trial court and by Appellant, infra, give more
favorable treatment to, and most often approval of, attempts by insurers to apply
the "regular use" clause to exclude coverage for liability insurance. On the other
hand, many authorities discussed in more detail, infra, refuse to apply the "regular
use" clause to exclude first-party, UM or UIM benefits to the innocent insured,
who is injured by the negligence of a third-party tortfeasor. The idea that courts
often express is that UM/UIM coverage is personal, and follows the insured
wherever she goes, and is designed to protect the insured against the risk of
damages caused by a negligent driver with inadequate liability insurance coverage.
Purpose and policy

In defining the term "underinsured motor vehicle" in the statute, the Utah
legislature implies some of the purpose and policy of UIM coverage in the
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statutory scheme. The statute identifies the underinsured vehicle as one "which
has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all
special and general damages" [UCA 31A-22-305 (8) (a).]

This definition implies that one of the central intents of first-party UIM coverage
is the motive to compensate the injured party for damages caused by a driver with
insufficient liability coverage. The Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed this
purpose of UIM coverage:

Underinsured motorist coverage is a facet of uninsured motorist
coverage; its purpose is to provide insurance protection to the
insured against damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the
motorist had another liability policy in the amount of the
underinsured policy. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company
v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) (Emphasis added).

Courts of numerous jurisdictions have recognized similar purposes in the
underinsured motorist coverage provided for in various states' laws.3

The Iowa Supreme Court, comparing the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage
with its counterpart, UIM, held:

3

Due to a dearth of controlling Utah case law on many of the specific issues
presented, persuasive opinions from sister states form a large portion of the
authority cited herein.

11

The purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to ensure minimum
compensation to victims of uninsured motorists. The goal of
underinsured motorist coverage, on the other hand, is full
compensation to the victim to the extent of injuries suffered.
Hamm v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co, 612 NW2d 775 (Iowa
2000), quoting Veach v. Farmers Ins. Co., 460 NW2d 845 (Iowa
1990) [Internal citations omitted.]

Finding a similar legislative intent, the Supreme Court of Kansas agreed that,
since:
The legislature's purpose in mandating UIM coverage is to "fill the
gap inherent in motor vehicle financial responsibility legislation and
compulsory insurance legislation." [The statute at issue] should be
liberally construed in light of the legislative intent to compensate
innocent persons damaged by others without sufficient insurance.
Cashman v. Cherry, 13 P3d 1265 (KN 2000), quoting Jones v.
Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, 981 P2d 767 (Kan.
App 1999).

South Carolina's Supreme Court found similar legislative intent and gave like
effect to the statute at issue there, holding that the

uninsured motorist statute 'is remedial in nature, enacted for the
benefit of injured persons, and is to be liberally construed so that the
purpose intended may be accomplished.' Unisun Insurance Co v,
Schmidt, 529 SE 2d 280 (SC 2000), quoting Gunnels v. American
Liberty Ins Co, 161 SE2d 822, 824 (SC 1968).

As these passages have demonstrated, courts are in general agreement as to the
nature and purposes of the UIM laws and insurance policies issued thereunder. A
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noteworthy distinction, however, and a critical element in considering
underinsured coverage, involves giving careful consideration to the relationship of
the party seeking damages to the negligent driver and to the insurer who is asked
to pay. The Minnesota Court denied recovery to an injured passenger who had
already recovered on a liability claim against the negligent driver of the car in
which the injured passenger was riding, and who then sought UIM coverage under
the same policy, holding that:

[claiming first-party benefits under the policy of the owner or
insurer of the ' at-fault' vehicle would be tantamount to converting
* * * underinsured motorist coverage into more expensive thirdparty liability insurance. West Bend Mutual v. American Family
Mutual, 586 NW2d 584 (Minn. 1998), (alteration as in original)
quoting Perfetti v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y., 486 NW2d 440, 443
(Minn. App. 1992).

Here, the danger noted in West Bend is absent: Valentine is not claiming both
liability coverage and UIM coverage from the same policy. She received liability
coverage from the negligent driver's insurance, and now makes a first-party claim
on her own policy for that part of the value difference between the liability
coverage received and her actual damages, as her policy promised to pay.

Rather than the insured trying to "convert...underinsured motorist coverage into
more expensive third-party liability insurance" as discussed in West Bend, it is the
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insurer attempting to convert first-party underinsured motorist coverage, for which
Valentine paid regular premiums in good faith, into conditional, "if only"
coverage: "if only" Valentine had been a pedestrian, delivering goods for her
employer on foot, when she was injured by the underinsured driver - she could
recover. "If only" she had been a bicycle courier, injured by the same driver - she
could recover. Even, perhaps, "if only" she had been a passenger in the same
company truck, which she never drove but daily went out together with another
employee on delivery runs, would she have recovered? Or would Farmers claim
that the vehicle had been "furnished or available for the regular use by" Valentine,
such that the company would claim the exclusion applied? "If only" she had been
on a skateboard, on horseback, on roller-skates, or even in a rocking chair on her
employer's front porch on her ten minute break when injured by the underinsured
driver4, she would have recovered under her policy of underinsured motorist
coverage.

In keeping with the authorities discussed, supra, and the policy and intent of the
Utah UIM coverage statute, Valentine maintains that the policy at issue should be
liberally construed in her favor to effectuate coverage for her damages caused by
the negligence of an underinsured motorist.
4

With apologies to the Motorists Mutual Ins Co v. Bittler, 235 NE2d 745 (Oh.
Misc. 1968) court.
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UIM Coverage Follows and Protects the Person

In considering similar exclusionary clauses in UIM coverage, many cases have
held that the nature of UIM coverage is that it follows and protects the insured,
rather than depending on a particular vehicle covered, as in liability policies. (See,
e.g.: State Farm v. Duran, 785 P2d 570, 572 (Ariz. 1989); Jones v. Horace
Mann Insurance Co, 723 A2d 390, 393 (Del. 1998); Bass v. State Farm Mutual,
196 SE2d 485, 489 (Ga. App 1973), affirmed in part, reversed in part, State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 201 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 1973); Allstate v. Kaneshiro,
998 P2d 490, 499 (Hawaii 2000); Prudential Insuiunce Co v. Martinson, 589
NW 2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1999); Veness v. Midland Risk Insurance Co, 732 NE2d
209, 214 (Ind. 2000); Squire v. Economy Fire and Casualty Co, 370 NE2d 1044,
1049 (II. 1977); Farnwis Insmum < r (iilhert, 791 P2d 742 (Kan. App 1990);
Dupin v. Adkins 17 SW3d 538, 543 (Kentucky App 2000); Hobbs v. Rhodes, 667
So2d 1112, 117 (LA app 1995), rehearing denied; Niswonger v. Farm Bureau,
992 SW2d 308, 313 (Mo. App. 1999); Motorists Mutual Ins Co \ Bittler, 235
NE2d 745, 751 (Oh. Misc. 1968); Pentz v. Davis, 927 P2d 538 (Ok. 1996);
Bilbrey v. American Automobile Insurance Co, 495 SW 2d 375 (Tex. app 1973);
Grange Insurance v. Great American Insurance, 575 P2d 235, 239 (Wash., en
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banc 1978); Clark v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co, 577 NW2d 790
(Wise. 1998)).

A statement from the Niswonger decision is typical of the holdings of this line of
cases:
Both uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured coverage are in
the nature of floating, personal accident insurance rather than
insurance on a particular vehicle, and thus follow the insured
individual wherever [s]he goes." Niswonger v. Farm Bureau, 992
SW2d 308, 313 (Mo. App. 1999) (Emphasis in original).

Similarly, an oft-quoted decision has held that UIM coverage is "limited personal
accident insurance chiefly for the benefit of the named insured." Motorists
Mutual Ins Co v. Bittler, 235 NE2d 745 (Oh. Misc. 1968).

The public policy considerations inherent in the holdings noted above apply
equally here. The Utah legislature has created a comprehensive scheme of
insurance coverage, with insurance companies required to offer UIM with every
policy of automobile insurance issued, which UIM coverage may only be waived
by an express written waiver from the policyholder.
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The "Regular Use" Clause

The "regular use" exclusionary clause has a long and somewhat convoluted
history in case law interpreting the phrase and some phrases of very similar
exclusions. A body of jurisprudence has built up around the "regular use" clause
and its close variants, but Utah courts seem to have contributed only two fairly
ambiguous decisions to that body of law, one of which is procedurally unorthodox
and of little, if any, precedential authority.5

In Mann v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co, 382 P2d 884 (Utah 1963), the
Utah Supreme Court considered the application of the "regular use" exclusion.
The Mann court found the exclusion applicable on the facts presented without
elaborating on the rationale behind its holding.

Some Interpretations of the Meaning of "Regular Use"

Courts interpreting the phrase "regular use" have reached widely varied
conclusions as to factually, what is "regular use." Appellants submit that the
5

In Metropolitan Prop. & Liability v. Finlayson, 751 P2d 254 (Utah App. 1988),
vacated procedurally, 766 P2d 437 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals
considered the application of the "regular use" exclusion and initially found the
exclusion ambiguous, and therefore, construed the clause in favor of coverage.
After the Court issued its opinion, the losing party requested, and the Court
granted, a rehearing. Before the court heard the matter again, though, the parties
to the case reached a settlement. The Court then vacated its prior decision.

17

jurisdictions and opinions that have the more compelling arguments are among
those authorities that have found that "regular use" implies and includes:

— "unfettered ability to regularly use a vehicle according to his/her whims, needs,
or desires." American States Insurance Co v Tanner, 563 SE 2d 825, 833 (W.
Virginia 2002);

— "expressed or implied understanding with the owner of an automobile that the
insured could have the use of the particular automobile or perhaps any automobile
of the other at such times as he desired, if available." George B. Wallace Co v.
State Farm, 349 P2d 789, 792 (Or. 1960), accord Crum and Forster v. Travelers
Corp, 631 A2d 671, 673 (Penn. Supp. 1993)

— "continuous use, uninterrupted normal use for all purposes, without
limitation as to use; customary use as opposed to occasional use or special use"
Travelers Indemnity Co v. Hudson, 488 P2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. App 1971);
Snodgrass v. State Farm, 804 P2d 1012, 1024 (Kan. 1991); Central Sec. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 681 P2d 15 (Kan. 1984) (Emphasis added).
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— "steady or uninterrupted use for all purposes and without limitation" Columbia
Mutual Insurance Co v. State Farm, 905 P2d 474, 478 (Alaska 1995).

Appellant submits that there is no dispute that Valentine had no "regular use" as
defined and accepted by these numerous authorities. Her opportunity to use her
employer's vehicle was not "unfettered," "at such times as she desired,"
"uninterrupted normal use for all purposes," nor "without limitation." To the
contrary, Valentine had explicitly circumscribed authority to use the truck only
directly in service of her employer's business needs: to take parts from the
warehouse to the customer. She had no personal use of the vehicle. She did not
keep the vehicle at her home, nor did she even retain keys to the vehicle. She did
not take the vehicle for personal errands or trips such as lunch breaks. Under the
undisputed facts of the case, arguably, Valentine may have used the vehicle with
regularity (that is, in a regular pattern on her workdays) but the vehicle was
absolutely not furnished or available for her "regular use" in the sense rationally
and reasonably described by the authorities noted above.

The phrase is ambiguous

Many courts that have considered the "regular use" and similar exclusions have
found it to be ambiguous as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Tillotson v. Farmers
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Insurance Co, 637 SW2d 541, 543 (Ark. 1982); Ohio Casualty Insurance Co v.
Travelers Indemnity Co, 334 NE2d 1, 3 (Ohio App. 1974); Ricci v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co, 290 A2d 408 (RI 1972) (listing cases finding the
phrase ambiguous or not); Dairyland Ins. Co v. Ward, 517 P2d 966 (Wash. 1984)
(calling the phrase "ambiguous in a very real sense")).

According to principles of contract law, "[generally, an ambiguity in insurance
policy language exists only if the language is fairly or reasonably susceptible to
two or more different but reasonable interpretations or meanings". [16 Williston
on Contracts, 49:17 (4th ed, 2000)] Beyond this oft-repeated test and its variants,
however, are questions probing deeper into the language of the phrase at issue.

One court has framed the issue of ambiguity more starkly, holding that an
"ambiguity arises when there is duplicity, indistinctness or uncertainty in the
meaning of the words used in the policy". Niswonger v. Farm Bureau, 992
SW2d 308, 316 (Mo. App. 1999). The Niswonger Court went on to state:

[l]anguage is ambiguous if 'it is reasonably open to different
constructions,' and, in determining whether that is the case, 'the
language used will be viewed in the meaning that would ordinarily
be understood by the layman who bought and paid for the policy.'
Id. [Citations omitted.]

20

Further, "[a]n automobile insurer, having affirmatively expressed coverage,
through broad promises, is under a duty to define any limitation or exclusionary
clauses in clear and explicit terms. [17 Williston on Contracts, 49:112 (4l ed,
2000)].

Once an ambiguity is found in a contract:

[t]he well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with
respect to construction of a contract should be resolved against the
party who had drawn the agreement. Sears v. Riernerstna, 655 P2d
1105,1107 (Utah 1982).

With these principles of insurance contract interpretation in mind, the question
follows: is the exclusionary clause Farmers relies on to deny UIM coverage to
Valentine ambiguous? Whatever else it may be, it certainly is confusing:
Uninsured Motorist Coverage (and Underinsured Motorist Coverage
if applicable) does not apply to damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any vehicle other than your
insured car (or your insured motorcycle if this is a motorcycle
policy), which is owned by or furnished or available for the regular
use by you or a family member. (Emphasis in original). [R. 39]

A simple reading of the wording of the endorsement reveals that it is "fairly or
reasonably susceptible to two or more different but reasonable interpretations or
meanings" and that there is "indistinctness or uncertainty in the meaning of the
words used in the policy." {Niswonger, supra). It is unclear whether the
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endorsement attempts to exclude from UIM coverage protection vehicles that are
"furnished ... by you". If so, clearly the Frank Edwards vehicle Valentine was
driving does not come within the ambit of the exclusion in any way, in that the
insured (Valentine) or a family member in no way "furnished" or made available
that vehicle to Valentine. That is, the vehicle she was driving when she was
injured by the negligence of the underinsured driver was not "furnished...by you
[the insured]" in any sense.

Also, not only is the phrase awkwardly worded so as to make it reasonably
susceptible to two or more plausible meanings, but the word that makes the phrase
most odd is also the principle deviation in the phrase from the language of the
statute. The Utah code speaks in terms of a "vehicle owned by, furnished, or
available for the regular use of the insured" [emphasis added], which, while
perhaps not perfectly clear, is at least far more intelligible grammatically than
Farmers' choice of the word "by" in the spot in the sentence where " o f appears in
the statute.

Further, the endorsement containing the exclusion is set apart from the body of the
insurance policy, appended after the end of the main text of the policy language.
The purported exclusion is placed such that it would be unlikely to be ascertained
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as a potential restriction on coverage by the "layman who bought and paid for the
policy" (Niswonger, supra).

The twelve words directly at issue, "owned by or furnished or available for the
regular use by you" are far from the clear and unequivocal language required to
appraise an insured of her rights and responsibilities under the policy. Nowhere in
the policy is the phrase "furnished or available for the regular use by" nor any of
its component parts defined. Only upon the denial of a reasonable claim and the
instigation of litigation is the insured left to ask "what is meant by the words
'furnished or available for the regular use by'"?

On initially scanning the words for grammatical correctness, it seems as if there is
some typographical error in the choice or alignment of the words, in that the word
"by" to modify the words "furnished or available" seems to require that it is the
insured, Valentine, who is to have "furnished" the vehicle. Clearly, under that
reasonable reading of the plain language of the policy, Farmers could show no set
of facts that would make the exclusion applicable to Valentine.

The Colorado Court of Appeals considered a challenge to a nearly identical phrase
in Cruz v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 12 P.3d 307 (Col. 2000), and dismissed
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the plaintiffs contentions that the strange word choice significantly affected the
clarity of the exclusion. Here, however, the odd phrase is one step more bizarre
than in Cruz, in that the otherwise identical phrase contains the word "the" where
it seems to have no logical place ("furnished or available for the regular use by
you or a family member"). Perhaps the Cruz court would dismiss that irregularity
as well, but appellants maintain that, taken together, the phrase crosses the line
into legal ambiguity, and urges the Court to so find.

Finally, even the two simple words at the heart of this and many other insurance
policy disputes - "regular use" - are ambiguous in that they are undefined in the
policy and are susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. Does
"regular use" mean substantially similar to the use one makes of one's own
vehicle - that is, available and capable of being used for all purposes, at any time,
without restriction, similar to the finding of the courts discussed, supra? If so, the
exclusion clearly does not apply. Or, is "regular use" limited to mean recurring in
a regular pattern, as the trial court found? If so, Valentine's use may have been
"regular" even if the vehicle was not necessarily "furnished" or "available" for her
"regular use." Appellant maintains that the clause is ambiguous in a very real
sense, and this Court should hold the claimed exclusion to be void.
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Alternate views: the phrase is NOT ambiguous

At least one court has noted that it is "not the use of ambiguous language which
causes courts to disagree about the meaning of the exclusionary language,
'[c]ourts struggle with its application because each case must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances and therefore, its application is a struggle. Its
meaning is not.' Crum and Forster v. Travelers Corp, 631 A2d 671 (Penn. Supp.
1993), quoting Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 681 P2d 15 (Kan. 1984).6

Some courts have found that the phrase, as included in policies of insurance, is not
ambiguous. See, e.g. Farmers Insurance v. Zumstein, 675 P2d 729 (Ariz. App
1983); Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, supra (noting that the phrase
"regular use" may seem to have several possible meanings, but still finding it
unambiguous nevertheless).

6

As the Court noted in Finlayson, supra "[s]omewhat surprisingly in view of the

inconsistent interpretations courts have given the term, some courts have found the
term 'regular use,' even when undefined, is not ambiguous." Finlayson, 751 P2d
at 257 (Utah App. 1988), vacated procedurally, 766 P2d 437 (Utah App. 1989).
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It is important, however, to note that the vast majority of courts to consider the
"regular use" exclusion, and uphold it, as not ambiguous and not in violation of
public policy are considering the exclusion in the liability coverage context.
That is, when an injured third party, a stranger to the contract of insurance, seeks
to recover damages that the insured would otherwise be liable to pay because of
the insured's negligent use of the insured vehicle, courts are much more likely to
find the "regular use" or some similar "other vehicle" exclusions to be valid and
applicable. But to the contrary, when courts consider the "regular use" clause in
the UIM context, as here, there is more generally agreement that the UIM
coverage should properly follow the person, regardless of where she is when she is
injured by an underinsured, negligent driver. (See discussion, supra).

Valentine maintains that the clause in her policy of UIM coverage is ambiguous in
a very real sense, and this Court should hold the claimed exclusion to be void.
The choice of words is confusing and unclear, and the insured is left to speculate
as to their meaning. In such a case, public policy and the weight of authority
mandate that the ambiguous phrase be interpreted against the party who drafted it
- Farmers - and in favor of underinsured motorist coverage for the innocent,
injured, insured. Nicole Valentine consistently paid her premium to minimize the
risk of substantial financial damages caused by a negligent driver without
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adequate liability insurance, but she is now in danger of not getting the benefits of
her bargain with Farmers.

The "Regular Use" Clause as Applied in this Case

In granting Farmer's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court adopted the
definition found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary defining "regular" as "acting"
or "done" or "recurring uniformly" or "calculably in time or manner, habitual,
constant, orderly." [R. 227 at page 32-33] Taking the word "regular" by itself,
apart from the other language of the clause requiring that the other vehicle must be
"furnished or available for the regular use by you" further contributes to a
misleading application.

The meaning of the words "furnished" or "available" are equally critical as the
word "regular":
In non-owned automobile coverage 'furnished' and 'available' are
not synonymous; the former term requires that the potential use of
the automobile be to a substantial degree under the control of the
insured." (Citations omitted); Couch on Insurance 3d, Section
121:65.

It is this issue of the "substantial degree" of control over the vehicle that the
insured is using that is critical. In the underinsured motorist coverage statute in
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effect at the time, UCA § 31A-22-305 (10) (a) - amended since the date of the
collision at issue, December 6, 2000, to place the operative language in a different
sub-paragraph and slightly reworded - the law allows that UIM coverage will
apply to the use of a vehicle "owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use
o f the insured only if the vehicle is described in the policy under which claim is
made, or is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the policy. See
UCA 31A-22-305 (10) (a) (2000), The issue the legislature seems focused on is
the degree of control the insured has over the "other vehicle" - is it a vehicle over
which the insured had sufficient control to have an insurable interest in it? If so,
the vehicle is "owned by or furnished or available" to the insured, and the insured
should take responsibility for covering the vehicle with requisite insurance.

The statute seems to be putting the burden on the insured, when using a vehicle
other than that listed in the policy, to see that it is covered, rather than relying on
coverage on another vehicle to cover the risk. Here, however, the vehicle at issue
was never in Valentine's control to the degree that she could insure it, so that
burden is not fairly placed on her.

7

See current UCA 31A-22-305 (9)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), deleting the phrase "regular
use" from the statute and appearing to clarify the focus on a vehicle which the
covered person has a requisite degree of control over (e.g., an insurable interest, as
discussed, infra).
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Valentine's use may have been "regular" in a sense that the trial court, in applying
the dictionary definition, found it to be, in that it was "recurring uniformly" on
typical workdays. Appellants maintain, however, that it is logically and legally
incorrect to leap from that simple isolated definition of just one of the words of the
disputed phrase, to a blanket definition of the entire exclusion against the interest
of the insured. Appellant maintains that this Court should properly reverse the
ruling in favor of Farmers.

Further, the trial court, on more than one occasion, emphasized the view that the
"main purpose of the exclusion is to limit coverage of vehicles that are not
declared in the insurance contract." [R. 227 at 33] Appellants argue that the trial
court's finding on this issue is in error, and inconsistent with the reasoned
authorities cited at length, supra, holding that UIM coverage is personal to the
insured, and not vehicle-dependent as liability insurance certainly is.

Conclusion and Relief Sought

Appellant submits that the conclusions of the court are incorrect as a matter of
law, and this court should properly reverse those conclusions. The phrase at issue
in the endorsement upon which Farmers relies for an exclusion of coverage is
ambiguous. As an ambiguous element in a contract of insurance, the phrase
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should be read most favorably to the insured, and in favor of coverage. Further,
the endorsement upon which Farmers relies for exclusion of coverage exceeds the
mandate of Utah law in regards to underinsured motorist coverage by adding
unnecessary and confusing words, and is void as against public policy. Finally,
the exclusionary clause is inapplicable on the facts presented in this matter, in that
Valentine did not have the Frank Edwards vehicle "furnished or available for the
regular use by" her on the undisputed facts. For all these reasons, Appellants
respectfully request this court reverse the Order granting Summary Judgment in
favor of Appellee Farmers.
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